The highs and lows of a military genius thought

There are few books that are both accessible and very deep. "The forgotten Manchuria" combines these two qualities. Focusing on the military art developed by theorists and practitioners of the Soviet Union, Jacques Sapir, economist and specialist of the USSR, gives us here a really fascinating study of a widely misunderstood subject in France, despite some "Soviet-mania" that is beginning to affect the Francophone blogosphere and popular magazines. Moreover, the author manages to show precisely critical vis-à-vis a brilliant military mind, and we do not hide nor his strokes of genius nor its defects.

Jacques Sapir intends to analyze the Soviet military doctrine of "operational art" total but synthetically, origin - Russia's defeat by Japan in 1904-1905 - at the beginning of the nuclear age, which shuffles the cards of the debate Strategic. Any study on the doctrine raises questions about its intellectual and factual foundation, but also the necessary dialectic between theory and practice, which enables or disables the conceptions forged in the minds of elites. If the author briefly outlines the lessons learned As the confrontation which opposed the Soviet Union to Hitler's Germany, the concrete aspect lies rather in opposition, twice, between the Japanese Kwantung Army and the Soviet army. This theater of operations holds relevance of what he saw these armies face three times, at three key moments for the Soviet operational art: the first corresponds to the origins of the doctrine (1904-1905 war) the second to the first application of this doctrine (Khalkhyn-Gol battle in the summer of 1939), the third, the operation that reveals the mastery acquired by the Soviet army in the application of its innovative designs (crushing of the Kwantung army in 10 days in August 1945), while the topographical constraints and implications for logistics remain. But the book sees further: Jacques Sapir suggests considering military debate as structurally related to the society in which it emerges, as part of a total history because military. Far from constituting a separate domain, organization of the armed forces and their use reveal societal, and power relations that are not immediately discernible to the viewer. This is where the "added value" of the intellectual journey of the author, who happens to be an economist. For the parallel between phenomena detectable in the economic sphere and are also found in the military sphere of the Stalinist USSR, it becomes possible to think of these phenomena as the manifestation process at work in the whole society Soviet. Confusing or strange facts that have caused the misfortunes of the Red Army (the will of "production for production", the great purges of 1937-1938) then become intelligible without mobilizing the only "Stalin factor." This is, to me it seems, a major contribution of this book for understanding the Soviet Army and its operational art, providing whose equivalent does not exist, to my knowledge, in Anglo-Saxon historiography. But we will return.

The book opens with a stimulating introduction, which raises the impossibility of thinking the problem of a doctrine without considering its interactions with the political sphere, the economic sphere and technical developments, which has a particular meaning for EU Soviet dictatorial or arose the question of the politicization of the army and of how ideology could - or should - result in the organization of the armed forces, where the opposition between logic political and professional logic. Military doctrine is also described as the result of a permanent tension between the intellectual construction and concrete cases in which this birth incessantly, necessitating further analysis of the adequacy of the concepts and the military situation that the Soviet Union will experience during the Second World War.
In the relationship of the appearance of the constituent elements of the intellectuals and debates Art operative who built it, one is struck by the thought of authors disagree (war will be long / short, for example) have found reconciled by the experience of war. We also note the contributions of various thinkers (Svetchine Varfolomeev Triandafillov) and the influence of Tukhachevsky, which allowed the operational art to become the key concept of the USSR in the early 1930s, and was also responsible imbalances that were to affect greatly the efficiency. Everything is presented with clarity and pedagogy, even if one still wants more details. The story stops after the turning point that marked the great purges of 1937-1938, dashing a brilliant generation of thinkers. It also raises the limits of operational art as it has developed as a theory, by highlighting the "pathologies" (ie the flaws): excessive centralization, the war economy of logic in peacetime, the material accumulation, lack of staff training, etc. But Jacques Sapir concludes that the Soviet military thought, despite these flaws, is not flawed in its essence, as fixes in place during the war he was allowed to acquire a fearsome efficiency.
The account of operations following the theoretical presentation is well structured and illustrated readable cards, even if the story of the 1904-1905 war is generally more difficult to track than the later conflicts. The author aptly highlights the doctrinal differences between the two armies, plans of operations, and the ability of the Soviet Army to learn quickly from mistakes, and cope with the unexpected. Follow the movements of armies is a pleasure, although I regret that the numbers are not usually listed (in a certain place of the forehead, how many how many Soviets against Japanese?).
The last part endeavors to place the development of operational art in the social context of the Soviet Union. If one is struggling to see, at first, where the author is coming, we finally understand that the vices that marked the development and application of this doctrine are partly originate in history (the inheritance representations of the tsarist army and the distrust of the officers there who have their weapons), but also in the power relations that mark the society and the political world. Thus, inventory accumulation in 1930 (the "fetishism of capital") is explained as much by political pathology (figures make a diplomatic argument) by a lack of legitimacy affecting both Stalin that military elites: do justifying their authority by a charismatic domination they are expected to exercise, it is by patrimonialism and clientelism, failing to professional legitimacy, that the elites remain; hence the need to produce more. This invites us to consider in a new light the very nature of political society and the political and societal context in which all military doctrine. However, we can blame this chapter does not dwell enough on the economic and sociological conceptual vocabulary that is used all the time. All this, despite his interest regularly suffers from a lack of clarity. Such development would need to be immediately accessible, more development in the book. It is also regrettable that this last chapter explicit pathological process (and the notion of pathology) he desperately discussed in the introduction. We are therefore forced to read these passages in light of what we learned last chapter.
The conclusion returns to the disintegration of the Russian army as it appears to the developer-Chechen war. It includes pathologies which previously suffered under Stalin the Soviet army. Unfortunately, the author is stingy with explanations as to what to conclude from the teachings of the conflict, next to the theory of operational art.

By analyzing this book comprehensively the history of operational art before the nuclear age, Jacques Sapir therefore gives us an admirable study that can serve both as an introduction to the study of Soviet theories and doctrine deep operations. At the same time, the quality of the analysis can recommend "The Forgotten Manchuria" to anyone with an interest in military history, including the most erudite.