A good summary of the SGM enjoyable to read, full of anecdotes; but sometimes exceeded or reducing. For example -l'auteur critical yugoslavia campaign that would have delayed Barbarossa 6 weeks. (false climate is too bad mid-May, ds delays the delivery of supplies) -L'auteur Ignored the logistical constraints in North Africa, it recommends increasing the Africa Korp, while barely supply (almost 100% Italian). -Suggere Delay Barbarossa by first securing North Africa under the pretext that the situation would have been much the same. Questionable, the Soviets having time to recover from the Stalinist purges by training officers and soldiers, over the USSR would have built more t-34 Sturmovik and Katyusha ... -The Critical of the choice of Kursk. In reality this choice is - worse. The defense is suicidal (the US and the USSR STRENGTHENING much faster than the shaft) the unconvincing elastic defense (what if several offensives, how to run it in the forests and northern swamp?) Etc ... Kursk is the only valid and reasonable goal (CF Jean Lopez, Kursk 40 days that have ruined the Wehrmacht) In short the analytical side is rather doubtful. Whole swathes of the war is more regrettable that are shipped in a few lines (Sino Japanese War, Operation Bagration, Vistula River Oder, Manchuria etc ...) But work remains honorable, especially this book is a synthesis to be accessible.
