The art of war for the only early nineteenth century

Written by Clausewitz in 1812 to the attention of his royal pupil Crown Prince of Prussia, these "Fundamental Principles of military strategy" are intended as a manual steering armed as they exist in the early nineteenth century.
The book is divided into 4 parts:
1 - The principles for war in general, where Clausewitz describes briefly the character of warlord and the ways it can apprehend war.
2 - tactical or combat doctrine, which speaks, defensive and offensive, the way we have and the troops are used, how to grasp the ground, to favor maneuvers, etc.
3 - The strategy, conceived as administrative (number of troops to be raised, taking into account the supply lines), political (control and to ally the population) and of course military. Note that this last part, Clausewitz is far less precise than for tactics, for if he advises several maneuvers that work in tactics, it does no book, by simply designating targets based on offensive or defensive character the strategy adopted.
4 - The implementation of these principles in the war when it is recalled that the war is not a science as such: its principles are simple and based on common sense, and some of those who practice the best did not receive training. But war is also the area of ​​"friction", that is to say uncertainty, the unexpected, the approximations that are cleverly calculated that a plan is never executed according to the theory. Solutions reduce this friction; for example the activity of the commander in chief, and his confidence in his qualities, and his requirement. Finally, Clausewitz says that the study of campaigns and battles can only - field experience to default - allow to test the principles, and to measure the importance of the "friction".

Although named "Fundamentals of military strategy", this book seems to focus primarily at the tactical component of the war, reflected the importance of the part that is dedicated to him; perhaps he should see that the war then rule on the idea of ​​"decisive battle" (hence the impression I got from reading this book that the strategy was somehow subordinate tactics), or that unlike many generals who will never have to deal with strategy, a monarch who took command of the army must be aware of the tactic as strategy. Still, these two levels of the war are addressed.
That said, the principles in this little book are not valid at all times: they are those who serve the armies of the nineteenth century. Thus one who is interested in the Napoleonic Wars will be happy explanations given on orders of battle, the run commands, the role of different weapons, etc. He who seeks to understand the wars of the twentieth century through this book will probably be disappointed, because many are the "principles" that no longer correspond to current armed. For example, the refusal of the strategic encirclement, or the primacy given to the battle to settle the dispute. This feature is also intended by the author, who is interested in the war of his time, and supports its demonstrations mainly on the success of Napoleon and Frederick the Great.
It added that it places great emphasis on the need to organize in deep order (form and place reserves to deal with any eventuality), the relevance of the envelopment tactics and the fact of always pursue a higher purpose that of the enemy.

Clausewitz speaks clearly and about is simple to follow, especially as some diagrams illustrate reflection. Brevity does not interfere with understanding. However, it must be remembered that this is more an introduction to how to conduct the war in the early nineteenth century rather than a comprehensive manual or detailed.
The brief analysis of Gregory placed Chamayou end of the book mainly concerns the concept of "friction".

In summary, this short book is a clear and very concise summary (80 pages) of the art of war of the early nineteenth century. The connoisseur will draw anything interesting, while those who wish to learn about the history of the Napoleonic Wars will find a starting point. In my case, his interest has been difficult to measure; I certainly better appreciated at the second reading, by concentrating on the historical roots of this text. The low price makes anyway a bit risky investment.