In his book '' Violence in Republican Rome "'tries Lintott the reasons and root causes of the violence that particularly marked the last phase of the Republic to work out. The first thing he has in this connection to archaic forms of popular justice as lapidatio (stoning), occentatio (singing songs of mockery), flagitatio (demand) and quiritatio (call for help). These behaviors emerged, although in the meantime, a legal system had developed well into the late Republic always get back on and were in some cases also by politicians as Publius Clodius instrumentalized (Take for example the occentatio described by Plutarch against Pompey). Furthermore has Lintott out that had been included in the legal principles of self-help, the use of force not only tolerated in certain situations, but was downright desirable. In survival of these forms of violence in popular justice and law Lintott sees one of the roots of the excessive use of force in the late Roman Republic. In the second part, the author presents techniques of violence and describes the different categories of persons to an ambitious and unscrupulous politicians could fall back if he intended to enforce its goals by force. In question for clients arrived as well as through its own policies acquired followers (for example at the Gracchi), slaves and later hired gladiators. Also interesting is the way in which Clodius is the collegia '' bands '' made to prepare his to benefit. In part three to Lintott addressed the issue by any means on the part of the res publica was taken against the increasing violence. In this context, the author examines the role of the aediles and triumviri Capitales and could assume how these police tasks. Not surprising coming Lintott here to the conclusion that this could be the case only to a very limited extent or in exceptional situations. It regards a crucial structural deficit, which it the res publica made it impossible to effectively maintain order. Then considered Lintott the main republican laws against the use of force, the lex lutatia, the lex Plautia and adopted especially for the riots of 52 lex Pompeia. On the basis of a law of the empire Lintott attempt here to reconstruct the provisions of the republican laws and define reasonably sure the dating of the first two laws. Amazingly the Festellung is Lintott makes later, namely that one could cancel already adopted laws although due to a number of Technikalitäten, but not because of the use of force in the adoption of a law (this may seem surprising all the more since violence just mainly to enforce laws applications was used). The fact that it has just given here is no way to cancel, the use of violence for political purposes was not just discouraged. One possible explanation for this oddity might be that a certain level of violence was so common in popular assemblies that the danger would have existed if a corresponding regulation had been met, that virtually every law could potentially be open to challenge, the laws of bonuses , In the chapter on the Senatus Consultum Ultimum Lintott also makes some interesting remarks, as it borders it, for example by some similar Senate decisions as the tumultus or hostis statement. Since the declaration hostis namely not necessarily accompanied by the SCU, arises for the latter the (already at that time) controversial question of how far the consuls were allowed to go in the SCU actually. In the fourth and last part of his book Lintott describes the development of violence in the late Roman Republic of the Gracchi to the Civil War, which he sees as the logical endpoint of that ever-spiraling upwards spiral of violence.
Lintotts work is already therefore highly worth reading, as it represents one of the few truly comprehensive studies on violence in republican Rome. Mostly it is either treated briefly in overviews or taken individual aspects of the subject closer look, as Clodius and "banditry", the most executed with bloody means SCU or the Gracchi and their bloody end. Specifically makes Lintott also very remarkable findings about in terms of archaic forms of violence or the legislation against violence. However, some points are also not without its problems, such as that Lintott indicating the lack of police as a reason for the high level of violence in the Late Republic. Against this assumption are mainly two considerations (see Nipple: rebellion and '' police '' in the Roman Republic), the first of a fundamental nature. Lintott makes his statement without reflection from a modern point of view, of the nonexistence of the police can no longer imagine. But here is not about Rome, just no police in the institutional sense knows that exception but the modernity, because until at least since the 18th, rather only since the 19th century, a kind of police force began slowly in our sense to develop. Objectively, it may indeed be true that there had not been a police in Rome such a level of violence, but actual to ask for a comparison herbeizuziehen- something like how to reflect on why Caesar not by car to Gaul drove. The second is closely Erwägung- connectedness with the fact that Rome has understood before 133 broadly to provide a necessary, at least for the preservation and functioning of the state measures of relative calm. Challenges like Catiline conspiracy that yes took place in 63 also could be managed with the means, as you handle such situations quite flexible and could take the necessary measures ad hoc. Instead of a police, there were functional equivalents and the order did not work only, but they are konnte- up to the 50s years- even greater challenges do justice (Of course, it's always the question what kind of degree you invest in "peace and order"; compared with modern conditions it may be received always anarchic in Rome). The reasons for the increase in violence are therefore not to be found here. Despite this and some other objections that could collect, Lintotts book is still read with profit.
