A man who does not really loved France and no more collaboration proposals ...

Louvrage John Paul Cointet unsubscribe comes in a historiographical approach that finally the fundamental problem of the French cooperation, but above even the existence of the Vichy regime under the will and the political and strategic ambitions of Hitler. John Paul Cointet same masterfully this exercise, which shows how the cards distributed by the Führer, the Vichy regime as quaux ultra-collaborationists in Paris were beveled in a way that virtually no chance left to France regardless solution is chosen. For Hitler it was obvious that defeated France, navait way intended to regain great power status in a Europe that had been dominated by the Nazi.

Two preliminary points should be clarified: - on the one hand it is questionable why a seasoned historian as Mr. Cointet maintained in 2013 that the French losses sélevèrent 100,000 dead (page 114) during the campaign of France, even though the Service History of Defense has significantly planed dEpinal this image, giving the estimate official encrypted which is 58,829 deaths from May 10 to June 22, 1940 (excluding the Navy losses) and that the said information remains available on the On the other hand SHD website is found John Paul Cointet used quite extensively quotes louvrage Herman Rauschning "Hitler told me" that is a classic, but that made the object dune scientific controversy that is not even mentioned by Mr. Cointet. The authenticity of the statements attributed to Hitler by Hermann Rauschning was only rarely allowed.

The British historian Ian Kershaw particular judge: "I have not once mentioned the" Hitler told me "of Hermann Rauschning, a work whose authenticity now appears so thin that it is better to forget it altogether." Several German researchers have highlighted the lack of credibility of intimacy with Hitler claimed by Rauschning. This would have made Hitler met four times, never one on one, could therefore not have particular political collect such confidences, and would have drawn inspiration mainly in the literature of the time. His testimony is particularly found it implausible about supposedly hidden beliefs of Hitler against the Christian religion, he is the only one to report. All this is very well known and the controversy is summarized accurately on the Internet. Recall, however, a major historian quen France, in the person of Raoul Girardet has defended the book. Although this historical reference is highly dubious scientifically, louvrage Rauschning mavait personally impressed on the quality level of psychological elements that lon could collect on Hitler, which suggests that at least Rauschning had detailed sources that have been hidden to become so-called private interviews with the Führer.

If lon puts both sides of elements, the rest of louvrage is remarkably built and has considerable interest to those sintéresse this very dark period in our contemporary history. John Paul Cointet explains that French historiography has emphasized the impact of Hitler's policy on France, while foreign historiography (including Robert Paxton O) na granted quune
Minimum space at the Hitler vision of France. And it is precisely this element that the book of John Paul Cointet intends to deal well before the years 1939-1945. M Cointet rightly believes that the Führer has a central place in the system that it has established and is therefore contesting laspect of the State in terms of Hitler polycracy. : Because whatever the situation, this is he who has the last word, and furthermore "As for lantisémitisme, it is the foundation of the regime. Hitler has been the epitome of the regime ". Hitler identifies the wars which France opposed lont lAllemagne, of course with a prominent place for the first war of Hitler, and the fate lAllemagne at the end of the conflict is the result of the victory, French, this is pretty much true dailleurs because the Treaty of Versailles and exorbitant reparations demanded by France which doubts nothing, not even a major power dhumilier traditionally hostile to France since 1870. France is an obstacle to German policy in terms of Lebensraum, and then Hitler eventually traced lhostilité of France Legard of Germany to the treaties of Westphalia, "is the eternal enemy of the German people" and of course it also denounces France declares war "without reason" in 1939 against lAllemagne, but as points out Jean-Paul Cointet elimination of France militarily is not a goal in itself but "a means to put dune Service larger ambition: domination of the entire European continent." Of course the previous period to 1939, Hitler advance with extreme skill and great caution: it precludes the translation of "Mein Kampf" in French sweetened to publish extracts, the prohibition to publish the full text will however be overcome by France by Editions Fernand Sorlot (Latina New Editions) will be legally constrained to cease publication of the book, but not without having printed a considerable amount which will be marketed in douceurDonc Hitler's ideas of substance arises how France to be processed From 1940, without the power of ideas is reduced to the only person of the Führer. John Paul Cointet precise with powerful very well structured argument that "the Detat relations plan is never state it came to the idea of ​​making dHitler Vichy France an Associated State. Cà nest Quà the end of the war, putting aside a breathless regime that it will highlight the most determined of French collaborationists. This will lead to a fascist drift, ex-Vichy National Revolution ", this is the time or Vichy turns into what historians have called a" State Militia. "

In Mein Kampf France in reality noccupe quun limited space, including developments on foreign policy, at most a few pages, which bodes well as France, for what seemed to him loathsome noccupe not central to the thinking dHitler. It is in the second volume of Mein Kampf, published in 1926, emerges as the theme of a necessary annihilation of France, not as a means but as a necessity to be able to pursue an expansion of space vital to the East. Hitler makes a certain distribution of roles in a geopolitical sense, probably a little sketchy and even naive to lAllemagne with the granting of territories in the East; to Britain's domination of the seas in the Mediterranean lItalie: controlling all the ViaMichelin European states returning from right to Nazi Germany. What is particularly interesting this is the irrational belief possibility daccord dune between the UK and Germany, the first in maintaining its fleet and its colonial empire, allowed a free hand in Europe to Hitler. This persistent belief dune possibility negotiable dalliance with London will remain a chimera recurrent up to the moment when Hitler decide to trigger lopération Barbarossa against the USSR. In all this delusional dynamics defeat of France is not a war aim but a means: you have to defeat the enemy before conquering inherited the vast territories of the USSR.
In fact, this policy has nothing brilliant geopolitical and diplomatic level, it is based on feelings, intuitions, chimeras, but Hitler proved to be the period 1933-1939 a particularly skilled player and twisted as it strives with success does not raise concern among early French and British, at some point Hitler nexclut dailleurs not able to separate the UK from France. This is remarkably constructed and executed, which will not be the case for operations from 1941

In the second book, which was famous expose dHitler ambitions dune more structured way, it ny has actually nothing new. However, it is interesting that the author was anguished by the rise of non-European states with the foreground the United States with their enormous economic power in the short term the most dangerous opponent was the USSR, but longer term confrontation with the United States and Europe under German domination seemed inevitable. It is obvious that this is the action of Nazi Germany and its leader that will cause the implication of the two great USSR and USA powers and that of the European powers in leffacement Laprès Second World War, including Great Britain, is a direct consequence dune world war caused by Hitler (and Japan). We quun note of his relatives who had dune Anglo-Saxon university education Hanfstaengel, asked him to visit the United States to better appreciate the United States. The two men quarreled for different reason, and due Hanfstaengel sexiler the United States where he became adviser of American, not President Roosevelt as noted somewhat quickly Jean-Paul Cointet to evaluate the psychology of Hitler and his way of decisions: the Americans were relatively hard with this man who was interned First of ... In terms of relations with the geo-politician Karl Haushofer who are ready great influence on project Hitler, Mr. Cointe is a response more nuanced: Haushofer approved annexation of Austria, the Sudetenland and Memel, but three distinguished the essential point of Hitler thought he did not consider war as a priority means; it wasnt totally agree with the USSR conquest theories; Finally he did not have racist prejudices of Hitler.

Psychologically, John Paul Cointet gives some interesting elements: "a man trapped in a deep isolation, walled itself, naimant person without friends. Dautrui nattend quapprobation it because it turns an Exchange incapable true. Nothing ruffles him more quune logical argument or critique founded. Aware of its shortcomings, it closes any discussion where it could be placed in difficulty "with an obsession that led him to simplify all problèmesCette description is entirely consistent with the hypothesis of François Delpla with pathological personality marked by psychosis Semitic ultra-violent. Dailleurs John Paul Cointet considers the profound reality of the Nazi regime is a racist imperialism with global reach based on lasservissement or annihilation of entire population. Always accurate, it indicates that Hitler lacked of a strategy in the medium and long term, and gathered around the camp of Germany, is still mediocre lItalie militarily and Japan, which still fears the possibility of a Russian military intervention in Manchuria never nouvrira hostilities against the USSR: it must mean that a first attempt ended in disaster with a powerful response made by Zhukov in person, and therefore in the context of scribbles of German-Soviet pact of 1939, it was normal that Japanese show restraint.

The humiliating defeat of France is too well known to require that it be dy go into detail it's a real debacle, the result is an explanation in ignoble incompetence of French military leaders of that time, Gamelin and Weygand other, not to mention political staff dune frightening void. Soon enough the solution of a withdrawal is Africas abandoned in favor of a truce (hysterical Weygand lorsquon talks to continue the fight from Empire screams that this is just one bunch of niggers where you lose all power Bravo artist and hello for racism expressed !!!). The June 16, 1940 at midnight, while Paul Reynaud comes to hand to Philipe Petain, the foreign minister Paul Baudouin passed by lintermédiaire Spanish ambassador to a confused request that seems to ask what would be the German conditions of peace Hitler and as soon becomes aware of his own request sent Petain takes action that eventually daccroitre impossibility dune coordinated defense, while the Germans maintain pressure of their military offensive. On 25 June 1940, lorsquentre current Franco-German armistice armistice and French-Italian, German troops have all the resources to continue until the méditerranéeA priori Hitler seems to a complex calculation, the main concern is the control of the British fleet French which would result in a doubling of the considerable capabilities of the United Kingdom. Hitler believed that the best solution is the maintenance of a French government and France do not win or lAngleterre Africas North. From this point of view it appears to follow according the analysis of John Paul Cointet, Hitler believed that the future French government retains some of its sovereignty, which prevented the occupation of the total First of France, who had been considered; delivery fleet and claims of empire: the German occupation of land details were specified by the Führer who also intervened to moderate the claims of Mussolini. As for Convention darmistice presented in France it did not permit the inference that Hitler saw in France a potential ally in case of prolongation of the war. On 21 June 1940 the general formula Huntziger his feeling armistice conditions are "harsh and unforgiving" but contain nothing contrary to the honor, and finally Huntziger nonetheless asks the General Weygand gave him "to sign the order" (which seems to confirm that the honor might not be doing as saved it) finally De Gaulle himself in his third message broadcast June 22, 1940 denounced not only capitulation but a bondage. According to Jean-Paul Cointet, the German success in the signing of armistice especially is that it has not been negotiated with France, but only imposed: the French government by soliciting an armistice navait more Quà meet the imposed brothels finally It seems that the French government is convinced that "the victory of Germany is inevitable and definitive," we saw the UK be quickly defeated, and especially The event is thought in a Franco-German narrow intellectual framework there or De Gaulle reasoned in terms of global war; Finally, it was hoped that lAllemagne nabuserait no victory (!!!!). It was hoped to retain some assets, but the fleet was neutralized preserved (not for long) and France still had dun empire with North Africas which was a strategic position for the war in the Mediterranean, but with a very ambiguous use with the famous Paris Protocols Darlan which put a significant share of empire at the disposal of the Nazis in their war against the United Kingdom: of course Laffaire turned sour and the agreements were at best only partially applied: in 1940 we can distinguish between lattentisme Petain, vigilance Weygand who wished above all that the neutrality of his "armistice" is respected and will of Pierre Laval sengager in collaboration with Germany policy. On the side of Hitler, in a note dated 9 July 1940, it was stated that France wasnt an allied state, but a state with which the accounts will be settled on the day of the peace treaty, France had at most set to become an enlarged and Switzerland will become a tourism country can maintain a production capacity in the field of fashion, but obviously France became a major contributor to the effort German war.
John Paul Cointet reviews all the elements relating to gerrymandering French territory, to establishing dune dividing line that will hurt even German interests in the expulsion of people considered racially undesirable in Alsace and Lorraine, a well known lencouragement given independence Britons who were the henchmen of Nazism. The Vichy government although theoretically sovereign was subject to close monitoring that was divided Germans and Italians, war industry was of course placed under surveillance and the unoccupied zone (it officially nexiste no free zone) was subject to aerial inspections. The commission was essentially darmistice German with a French representation reduced to the state of mere delegation. Then of course comes in zone occupied the military government in France Lokh dependent on a multitude of more or less sinister services SS / SD and others, and of course lincontournable Otto Abetz, who will become ambassador to France in Paris, but never have accreditation dune: it is a key man of German policy, it must fund all political and similar movements that maintain confusion in France and help when this is necessary to raise the pressure on Vichy; at the same time it is privileged interlocutor and lami Pierre Laval, this is a francophone who is married dailleurs secretary Jean Luchaire: major work on this man are those of Barbara Lambauer who devoted a thesis, which then became a reference book. The economic pillage of French property is considerable, but the thing is even worse in the field of art or works involving various thugs from Goering to Alfred Rosenberg (who considers that Laval is "a Mediterranean Negroid") !!! Hitler himself has 39 large albums dinventaire property seized in France, more than 20,000 objects were repatriated in Germany with over 5,000 major paintings of artists.

In terms of anti-Jewish German policy, "it found the French Followers: French officials try to" justify "the status of 3 October 1940 as a dune sovereign political element to ensure" protection "to ethnic Jews French and German measures to anticipate. " "The law of Vichy nen nevertheless creates the conditions of a parallelism with German company's order. She even seems to want to demonstrate as a dexigence highest degree dapporter attempting a definition of the Jewish "race", that was not the German text. ' (Page 191): the analysis of Jean-Pierre Cointet negated the effort of the alleged "historian" Alain Michel who was trying to see in "the history of Vichy" by this author bail his theses against the alleged orthodoxy gentlemen Paxton Marrus Klarsfeld allegedly hatched a vile conspiracy "to tarnish the image of Vichy" approach to anti-Semitic policy (sic)

Abetz wrote in a report dated July 30, 1940 that "the idea of ​​the Reich is adapted to European idea, deeply rooted ideologically in françaisIl people would be possible for the European Reich usurp lide without infringing the requirement of continental leadership rooted in the German people by National Socialism. " The interlocutors, French, Laval the first literally rolled in flour: and this is big plus they are happy!

Frankly despicable role of Jacques Benoît-Méchin is analyzed in detail and see that this lon-German intellectual wanted with Otto Abetz engage France in a new way dordre: a Europe under the heel of the Nazis if possible with a generous back seat to France : from there to cogitate on a declaration of war against the French Anglo-Saxon, particularly against the United States, close to the ridiculous, and like many of French collaboration doffre receive only the shadow of contempt for the Third Reich masters. It is true that in the end, Hitler was increasingly indecisive on the French contribution dune possibility to its war against Bolshevism (presented as a European issue), but it's already too late militarily.

Whatever the configuration studied, efforts to sengager after the interview of Montoire Detat in cooperation with Germany was a policy doomed to linsuccès: Philippe Petain and Pierre Laval of France possess the heavy responsibility with a higher bid for tenders increasingly delusional . Even without considering the issue of participation of Vichy to the Holocaust and even admitting, only by a given time Pierre Laval has itself become frightened before the German requirements and is entrenched behind the marshal for refusing, in a final burst of lucidity, it is possible to conclude that France naurait never been a major state in a German Europe: at most a rump state associated with Reich