Signed by a British historian, already author of a famous biography of HitlerHitler he intends to answer a question: if the war in July 1944, can be considered lost for the 3rd Reich, why the regime he holds up April-May 1945 in the midst of the destruction, and why can it impose any reason against the continuation of fighting?
This question obviously brings other. For answer "because Hitler could not consider other issues that victory or total destruction of Germany" raises the question of why we still obeyed amid disasters. Ian Kershaw aside some explanations (the requirement of unconditional surrender of the Allies, which would have led to to rally around the regime of terror imposed on the German people by his masters, real but according to the historian does not explain everything) .
The response of the book: If the personal prestige of Hitler in the population declined because of losses, broken promises and suffering endured, the structure of charismatic power, she remained in place: that's what Ian Kershaw called "without charisma charismatic power" (p. 508). There was no space for discussion of the policy nor place up real will of the challenge: the obstinacy of the dictator to conduct the war as long as he was alive was law. In addition, executives who were related to him had no future without him, who burned their ships, and could be estimated to have no other way out but forward flight. The army finally remained faithful despite the hell she lived, she had not disintegrated.
What Ian Kershaw shows is that for key figures of the regime, the imminent invasion of Germany, the multiplication of setbacks was not just a problem, it was an opportunity. For them this would result in an addition, not a loss of power, which corresponded to the satisfaction of their fundamental aspirations. They were, so to speak, fulfilled the edge of the abyss. More Germany loses more Himmler, Goebbels, Speer, Bormann impose their views, extend their sphere of respective influence (and competitor). So an analysis of changing power structures and struggles between leaders that engages Ian Kershaw, analysis of the mechanisms of the Nazi state and analysis of attitudes of managers. The evocation of the conflict between Speer, who wants to keep many workers for the armament, and believes in the primacy of logistics, and Goebbels, who always wants more men to the front, and dreams of a people weapons, is one of the most interesting aspects of the book, revealing the tension between the two aspects, technocratic and illuminated the regime. No less than Goebbels, which offsets the losses of the Wehrmacht as it may, the responsibility of Speer in the continuation of the war appears overwhelming, to the measure of his talent for organization.
The creation in September 1944 of a militia composed of all men between 16 and 60 years, the Volkssturm [People's storm] was to translate the idea of total war, since all men were so made fighters. She could not turn civilians frightened by fanatical defenders of their country. However, it was symptomatic of a complete Nazification of German society, where everyone was now an enemy of the Reich in power if he was not ready to die for him or if he doubted only of victory.
The figures quoted by Kershaw show that German civilian losses during the last ten months of the war are comparable to those previously occurred throughout the conflict. As we know, the same period saw the continuation of the policy of extermination of designated enemies of the regime (p. 276-77).
Even more than the ruins of images, the most eloquent photograph from those of the book is in my opinion one where the mobilized Volksturm pass before Goebbels in a rainy and gloomy Berlin in November 1944.
PS. Translation by location could be reread more closely. See p. 275: "The vast majority of the German population is not measured [...] in [...]." The sentence is unclear.
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