The German-Soviet war surprises First, as rightly emphasized the preface of François Kersaudy by the breadth and richness of its documentation. Just refer to the 90 pages of notes, often commented upon, to be convinced. The 60-page bibliography, organized around the major themes that punctuate the book and make it easily accessible, strengthens the feeling of disbelief before the compilation work, worthy of a Benedictine and done upstream. The author drew on multiple sources (newspapers, correspondence, articles, interviews, memoirs, studies, tests, general and specialized works ...), ancient and contemporary, from many nationalities work consulted are available in French, English, German and even Russian. They feed a kaleidoscopic vision of the event. Let us, however, to reduce the German-Soviet war Nicolas Bernard in an ingenious and scholarly compilation of sources. We said that this is a synthesis, which means that the historian "appropriates" its sources in the best sense: he assembles them, understand them, makes them his own to forge a singular reflection about the war, its origins, its challenges and its consequences. After researchers made its predecessors the homage due to them by mentioning their aeuvres and discussion of their findings, he developed his own vision of the war in the East and subjects it to its readers. In this sense, the synthesis is exceeded. The difficulty of the exercise nonetheless increases with the extent of documentation which provides the researcher. Speaking of the German-Soviet war and World War II as a whole, one can measure the importance of the effort made.
Compose a history of the war in the East, even 650 pages, is a company that is akin to a challenge. So many events form the framework it would be sufficient to isolate a single to give material to the preparation of a book of the same size. However, the bet seems indeed won. Beyond its qualities of synthesis, the German-Soviet war is also a sum. She is the chronology and range of angles of attack. The author chose indeed to insert the Hitler-Stalin duel in long time in history. Upstream, he devotes much of his thinking to the origins of the confrontation, the crystallization of German nationalism and Pan-German side in the course of the nineteenth century the great diplomatic game surrounding the conclusion and the extensions of the Nazi-Soviet pact . Downstream, the historian highlights the results of the war for both States, of course, and the effects of it in the beginnings of the Cold War. The historiography of the war itself is not neglected in a long epilogue to the "war of memories" in Germany and Russia. If he cares so situate the conflict in a richer historical perspective, Nicolas Bernard also touches through its various facets. One of the merits of his book, and not the least, is not to succumb to the temptation of history-battle - although the military dimension of the war must put a significant place - but to embrace her in approach inherited from the total history. It is therefore a diplomatic war, ideological, cultural, material, strategic and military ... who comes to us. The author is most at ease when he describes diplomatic mysteries of the Nazi-Soviet pact and subsequent negotiations, less known, carried out in wartime in various directions. He describes with precision watchmaking mechanisms of the genocidal policy of the Third Reich in the East, because, do not forget, for the Führer, the conflict is primarily a war of extermination and enslavement. From a logistical point of view, it emphasizes the share of aid in the Anglo-Saxon giant Soviet war effort. The weapons enthusiasts will find all the details required on countless materials, armor and aircraft built on each side of the forehead and launched by whole batches, in a bloody encounter. The doctrines of war, strategy, tactics, via "operational art" so dear to Soviet generals, are subject to further discussion. Moreover, the historian is very interested in the German and Soviet societies immersed in turmoil, cymbals propaganda, the appalling Nazi plans for the conquered territories of the East, the brutality that Stalin continues to inflict its people before, during and after the war. We almost forget the main course: the war itself. All the key moments of it are part of a clear story: Operation Barbarossa, Moscow battle, the siege of Leningrad, the spring offensive in 1942 into the Caucasus, Stalingrad trap, setbacks and against attacks of 1943, the Battle of Kursk, the liberating offensive of 1944, the Battle of Berlin ... It should be noted that the period between the capitulation of the 6th Army and the Third Reich, often flown in textbooks, has long developments, although he flaw probably more to satisfy the enthusiasts. On the eve of every campaign or battle, the number of men and weapons, to the extent possible, meticulously recorded, so that the day after the confrontation in the balance sheet is drawn up, figures in hand. For these cross-dimensional, the German-Soviet war is a global history, almost total. But it is something else.
The role of the historian is certainly to narrate, describe and explain the sequence of events, large chains of cause and effect; it is also to renew the way of perceiving the past by making it intelligible in the light of the latest research and historical discoveries. If Nicolas Bernard is based on extensive documentation, as we have said, he uses it to build a free assessment and original events. In a style that is clear and simple, there is no question begs, even sometimes pay in the alternate history, a principle of rewrite history based on changes to an aspect of the past. Thus he conducts about a possible German victory in Moscow in 1941 and a hypothetical success when "Blue" operation in 1942. It is not there vain amusements of the mind, but a how to better gauge the objectives of war, the agreement means for the purposes dictated by the political power, the mistakes made at the strategic or tactical level. With the same freedom of judgment, he makes a balanced opinion on the Soviet operational art, thwarted by "the shortcomings of the economic and social system of Stalinist Russia," the crimes committed by the Red Army in Eastern Europe and Germany on the reasons for the Nazi collapse under the blows of a Soviet state with infinite human resources. He takes a sharp look at the complaisance of the Wehrmacht against the National Socialist regime and its involvement in all aspects of the political conduct of annihilation in the East. It reveals the tortuous manaeuvres Führer to unravel the son of the Grand Alliance which he sensed the victory in the second half of 1941, even before lacerations of the Russian cold. He also questions the notions of total or absolute war, concepts that blend well in the theater of operations oriental, and did not hide before the possibility of a comparison between Communism and Nazism, however provided push the comparison even in its ultimate consequence, the fate of which Russia would have been doomed if German victory. Thus the book-it contains the seeds of a good original historical thinking.
Such work can not be beyond reproach. The shells peppering the text suggests some editorial precipitation. A second edition of the book should do justice. Although maps are strong and involved about, they remain scarce, and the reader ignorant of Russian geography, Belarusian and Ukrainian sometimes risks being lost in names. Finally, the book, already large, would have easily supported over 200 pages, so playback is nice and rich content about. The brevity of style brings to wonder if the author did not deliberately withheld his pen to obey an editorial format. Even in his final delivery, the German-Soviet war Nicolas Bernard is, have no doubt, will become a reference.
